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Using well information & knowledge bases to inform decision-making for well management

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→ Introducing Oxand

→ Asset management & data management

→ Oxand's approach to well asset management

→ Oxand's solution: SIMEOTM WellBase





- Independent international engineering consultancy firm specialised in asset & risk management
- → Focus on life cycle optimisation of high risk capital intensive assets
- → UK business is centred on Oil & Gas and Nuclear Energy

• > £ 1000bn of CAPEX CAPITALISED IN SIMEOTM
• > 150 PERMANENT CONSULTANTS
• > £ 12m REVENUE




TRANSPORT (Roads, Railways, Ports...)







Introducing Oxand





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→ Important:

- Asset management ≠ Data management
- Asset management ≠ "looking after your assets"

Asset management = creating value from your assets

- Data management should support asset management by informing decisionmaking. For example:
 - Repair/replace?
 - Expand/consolidate?
 - Invest now/later?

Data collection needs to be targeted and data must be transformed into information, i.e;: analysed







Data – Information – Decision



- Definition
- Collection
- Treatment






Analysis

O_{Failure Scena}

3 3 2 2


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- → What is the optimum well design?
- → How urgently should we repair?
- → How often should we inspect?
- → How to safely extend operational life?
- → What is best abandonment plan?



Asset Management & Oxand's Approach








Link operational data with systemic risk based approaches to reinforce both curative and preventive decision-making

Increase industry partnerships and collaboration to share knowledge and experience on wellrelated risks

Develop risk management culture, tools and processes devoted to wells


Manage knowledge and effectively transfer experience from experts to young engineers








- → The main purpose of fault trees is to identify the sequences of events which could lead to a "major" or "system" failure (such as "release to atmosphere")
- → Fault trees also enable the estimation of the likelihood of the sequences of events identified using either qualitative or quantitative methods
- → Fault trees also support the assessment of the "criticality" of individual components by quantifying their importance to the functioning of the whole system






- Fault trees support the assessment of the "criticality" of individual components by quantifying their importance to the functioning of the whole system
- → If we know that component A (circled) has failed, set P_{fA} = 1, and calculate the effect on the probability of overall system failure (e.g.: release, P_R)
 - By comparing the relative increases in probabilities of system failure due to individual component failure we can arrive at a ranking of component criticality






General Overview of Methodology

ANALYSIS METHODS




Library of failure scenarios

What is the potential impact?




How likely and/or serious are these failures?




Fault Tree analysis

How could things escalate?



Event tree analysis



			Platform Well Type 1	Platform Well Type 2	Platform Well Type 3	Subsea Well Type 1	Subsea Well Type 2	Subsea Well Type 3	
	Single Surface		3	2	4	1	1	1	
Single Surface failures	Failure 1 Single Surface Failure 2		3	5	3	3	5	5	
	Single Surface Failure 3		2	2	2	2	2	2	
Multiple Surface failures	Multiple Surface Failure 1		3	3	3	2	1	1	
	Multiple Surface		4		5	2	2	2	
	Failure 2 Multiple Surface		3	3	3	2	2	2	
2	Failure 3		5		5	2	2	2	
	Subsurface								
a ce	Failure 1		4	5	4	4	4	2	
Sub-Surface failures	Subsurface Failure 2		5	5	5	5	4	4	
	Subsurface Failure 3		4	4	5	4	3	3	
Criticality			Required Action						
			ddress issue in the long term						
-			fress issue in the medium term						
			ddress issue in the short term						
			Assess issue						
5 Make well safe immediately									

Platform Wells Subsea Wells

Well failure criticality matrix


A failure scenario = a specific failure* on a specific well * or combination of failures

assessment






Integrity Threat Mapping



with **Simeo**[™] 15



Integrity Threat Mapping





The point of release of a potential leak scenario can provide a factor to qualitatively classify the severity of impact of that scenario


→ Points of release differ according to well architecture/design:

	Platform	Subsea tieback	Subsea
Platform	Platform wellhead seals Xmas tree valves/seals	Platform wellhead seals Xmas tree valves/seals	N/A
Above sea level	Conductor (above SL)	Riser (above SL)	Riser (above SL)
Below sea level	Conductor (below SL)	Riser (below SL) Mudline suspension seals	Riser (below SL) Subsea wellhead seals
Subsurface	Casings Cement sheaths	Casings Cement sheaths	Casings Cement sheaths
To production*	Via PWV at platform level	Through subsea PWV into flowline	Through subsea PWV into flowline

* Refers to scenarios in which isolation is not available upstream of PWV (i.e.: failure of SSSV and/or UMV and/or LMV)




- Assumed "bathtub" curve function for failure rate over component lifetime as per standard reliability engineering practice, e.g.: OREDA
 - → Early life failures not considered as per e.g. OREDA
- Translate function to estimate impact of ageing on failure rate within Design Life, using industry data as a benchmark





Apply component-specific ageing curve, defects and replacements to estimate failure rate over well-life












Risk Identification Generic Fault Trees Filtering method



Risk Assessment / FT Assessment




Intervention Planning Well Failure criticality matrix






WellBase: A Fault Tree Knowledge Base





WellBase: Assessing Potential Severity





Well data & knowledge enables an extensive register of well failures and risks to be "filtered" to identify relevant risks



Well type/function


Well design/architecture

Well age/history

Geological conditions

Environmental conditions


A "risk picture" can thus be built up for more specific cases, such as fields or individual wells





Collaborative Fault and event trees data bases are cost-effective to :

- → Create robust bridges between data and decisions
- → Train younger generations
- → Support operation integrity and risk workshops
- Make objective well risk assessments increasing exhaustivity of analysis





Simeo[™] WellBase





A risk-informed approach provides benefits for decision-making at all stages of the well lifecycle...



Determining optimum well design, component specs...

OPERATIONS

Asset management to create value from wells, optimising maintenance strategies...

ABANDONMENT

Planning P&A to ensure safety, minimise disruption to production...

... when deployed as part of a successful overall asset management process



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Thank you.



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